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Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations
(deontological judgment), or by taking into account the consequences of their
actions (utilitarian judgment). We propose that the latter coheres with a more general
cognitive mechanism – deontic introduction, the tendency to infer normative (‘deontic’)
conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference). Participants were presented
with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to
draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of
each choice separately. We predicted and found a selective defeasibility pattern, in
which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian
moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic
introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest
a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in which normative conclusions are
drawn from descriptive (although value-laden) premises. This family includes deontic
introduction and utilitarian moral judgment as well as other informal inferences. We
conclude with a call for greater integration of research in moral judgment and research
into deontic reasoning and informal inference.
Keywords: causal inference, defeasibility, deontic introduction, deontic reasoning, deontological moral judgment,
is-ought inference, new paradigm, utilitarian moral judgment
INTRODUCTION
Amsterdam, 1944. A knock on the door, imperative. At this hour it can only mean one thing; and
indeed, it is an SS officer standing at the door. Are all these children yours? He asks. As it happens,
they are not: Just before your Jewish neighbor was arrested and sent to a death camp, you had taken
her child into your home and promised to treat them like your own. You now face a moral choice:
tell the truth, and as a consequence condemn the child to a certain death; or lie, and save their lives
(MacIntyre, 1995).
For most of us the question which choice is the moral one is a no-brainer (although we might be
tempted to save our own skin). We live in a society where social lies are told as a matter of course.
We think little, for example, of complimenting a host on a dish we did not particularly enjoy.
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Surely telling a lie for the sake of saving lives is not just
permissible, but obligatory as well. But for Kant (1998/1785),
being consistent in reasoning was an utmost moral obligation,
expressed in the categorical imperative, which implies that a
reason for an action has to be universal. To have a reason, he
argued, is precisely to have a consistent universal principle, and
lying to get what one wants cannot be such a principle (Johnson
and Cureton, 2016). If all of us lied to try to get what we want,
then none of us could get what we want. People have a deon,
an obligation, as reasoning beings to be consistent; consequential
happiness or unhappiness matters little. In the philosophical
literature on metaethics, and the parallel psychological literature
on moral judgment, a broadly Kantian approach, based on
absolute obligations, is therefore dubbed ‘deontological.’
There is an opposite approach, which can be traced back
to Hume et al. (2000/1739-1740) and Mill (1971/1861), dubbed
‘consequentialist’ or ‘utilitarian.’ In the utilitarian approach,
moral judgment is based on in the consequences of our actions:
what is good is what results in the best outcome for the greatest
number of people. Thus, lying to the SS officer is a utilitarian
choice, because the consequences of lying are better than the
consequences of telling the truth. Of course, not all moral
dilemmas are as straightforward. In another scenario (Greene
et al., 2001), a group is hiding from deadly enemy soldiers. A baby
starts crying, threatening to give them all away. The only way
to ensure this does not happen is to smother the baby. The
utilitarian choice is still the same: take the action that saves the life
of many. The nature of the action, however, makes the dilemma
much more difficult to resolve.
People can make moral decisions either consequentially or
deontologically (or both), and often do: it depends on the
nature of the dilemma, as well as individual differences and
task demands. A particularly thorny debate revolves around
the nature of the psychological processes underpinning each
type of moral judgment. Greene (e.g., Greene et al., 2001;
Paxton and Greene, 2010; Greene, 2013) famously proposed
a dual processing architecture of moral judgment, according
to which deontological judgment relies on intuitive, emotion-
laden processes, which require little processing effort and are
associated with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex; whereas
utilitarian judgment relies on analytic, effortful processes, that
depend on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This approach
ties moral judgment with other dual processing accounts of
reasoning, judgment, and decision (Evans, 2008; Kahneman,
2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013), which make a similar
distinction between fast, intuitive processes (a.k.a. Type 1, or
System 1), and effortful, resource-hungry processes (a.k.a. Type
2, or System 2). The dual processing approach in general
is not without its critics (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011),
and in the psychological literature on moral judgment, where
the evidence seems equivocal (e.g., Kahane et al., 2012), the
debate has become so central that it is impossible to refer
to the deontological/utilitarian distinction without at least
mentioning it. However, there is more to moral judgment than
dual processing, and in this paper we focus on a different
aspect of the distinction between utilitarian and deontological
judgment.
HOW DO DESCRIPTIONS BECOME
NORMS?
Our research question is this: how do descriptions become
norms? Moral dilemmas describe situations, yet people readily
respond with normative judgments. How can people come up
with moral normative judgments at all, when the stories of
moral dilemmas make no explicit mention of moral terms? To
understand the nature of the question, consider another moral
dilemma, the staple trolley problem. First proposed by Foot
(1967), this is perhaps the most famous moral dilemma of all.
Here is Thomson’s (1985, p. 1395) much-cited version:
“Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley rounds a
bend, and there come into view ahead five track workmen, who
have been repairing the track. The track goes through a bit of
a valley at that point, and the sides are steep, so you must stop
the trolley if you are to avoid running the five men down. You
step on the brakes, but alas they don’t work. Now you suddenly
see a spur of track leading off to the right. You can turn the
trolley onto it, and thus save the five men on the straight track
ahead. Unfortunately, there is one track workman on that spur
of track. He can no more get off the track in time than the five
can, so you will kill him if you turn the trolley onto him. Is it
morally permissible for you to turn the trolley?”
Here is the rub: the vignette describes a situation, but contains
no normative terms as such. There is no mention of terms
such as ‘ought,’ ‘permissible,’ ‘must,’ and so on. Yet the question
calls for a judgment of permissibility – a normative, or deontic
judgment. Deontic logic (McNamara, 2010), the logic of norms,
of permissions and obligations, is the language we use for moral
choice, be it utilitarian or deontological. Deontic logic is a type of
modal logic, which uses terms such as ‘obligatory,’ ‘permissible,’
and ‘forbidden.’ Note that the term ‘deontic’ denotes the logic,
whereas ‘deontological’ denotes the type of moral judgment.
Deontic logic is the logic of norms and regulations; deontological
judgment is the moral judgment which relies of rights and duties,
i.e., pre-existing norms. Both terms derive from the Greek word
deon, duty. Deontic logic provides the lexicon and inference
rules for any moral judgment, be it deontological or utilitarian.
[Authors occasionally use ‘deontic’ as short for ‘deontological’
(e.g., Białek and De Neys, 2016), but this practice risks confusion
and is best avoided.]
Whether we decide that it is permissible to turn the trolley
so that the five workmen are spared and the one workman is
killed (traditionally considered utilitarian judgment), or that it
is impermissible to do so (traditionally considered deontological
judgment), it is a deontic, normative conclusion that we must
draw from descriptive premises. So how can we draw such
normative conclusion even though there are no explicit deontic
terms in the vignette?
Philosophers call this the ‘is-ought problem,’ or the ‘is-ought
fallacy.’ First identified by Hume et al. (2000/1739-1740), the
jury is still out on whether such inference from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ is
logically valid, and under which circumstances (Hudson, 1969;
Schurz, 1997; Pigden, 2010), but this is not our concern here.
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What concerns us is the psychological mechanism underlying
this inference from descriptions to norms. We need no more than
task analysis to see that moral judgment requires an inference
from ‘is’ to ‘ought,’ because moral judgment requires an inference
from a descriptive vignette (‘if I turn the trolley to the side
track, I will save the five workmen on the main track’) to a
deontic conclusion (‘I must turn the trolley’). Understanding how
this inference works can provide some novel insight into the
mechanisms of moral judgment.
As a more general observation, we note that, although
deontic reasoning is clearly relevant for moral judgment, and
although deontic logic provides the computational framework for
normative judgments in general and moral judgment specifically,
the two research domains generally lead separate lives (although
see Bucciarelli et al., 2008, for a rare attempt to connect reasoning
and moral judgment; and Holyoak and Powell, 2016, which we
discuss in the “General Discussion”). An integrative framework
can only benefit theoretical insight in both domains. We see
deontic introduction as one such theoretical link, but by no
means the only one. This is part of our motivation in the current
work.
INFERRING NORMS FROM
DESCRIPTIONS
In previous work (Elqayam et al., 2015) we proposed that
inference from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ is a pivotal, species-specific process
in human cognition, through which humans generate novel
norms where no norms existed previously (see also Schmidt
et al., 2016; Tworek and Cimpian, 2016). We call this type of
inference deontic introduction, because the inference introduces
deontic terms in the conclusion of an argument. Deontic
introduction is an informal, pragmatic type of inference, with
all this entails: it is sensitive to context, belief and utility; it
is enthymematic, defeasible, and probabilistic (Oaksford and
Chater, 2007, 2013); and it can be relatively strong or weak
(Over et al., 2010; Evans and Over, 2013). Deontic introduction
is supported by a largely implicit chain of inference leading from
the descriptive premises to the deontic, normative conclusion.
The typical context triggering deontic introduction is an action
which causally leads to an outcome with desirable or undesirable
consequences. For example, given that if Martin uses olive oil
his recipe will taste better, we readily infer that Martin should
use olive oil. Under these conditions, people tend to draw
deontic conclusions even when there are no deontic terms in
the premises. Figure 1 displays a flowchart of the processing
model from Elqayam et al. (2015), with the trolley problem as an
illustration.
The input to the inference is an action leading to a desirable
(or undesirable) outcome, often expressed in the form of a utility
conditional; for example, ‘if you turn the trolley, you will save the
five men.’ Utility is what we want (positive utility), or do not want
(negative utility); a utility conditional is a sentences of the form
if p, then q, which bears utility (Bonnefon, 2009). Note that this
is always presented in context – in this case, the vignette which
describes the dilemma.
The next stage in this implicit inference chain includes two
interpretative inferences: goal value inference, in which people
interpret the goal as desirable (or undesirable); and causal
inference, in which people interpret the existence of a causal link
between the action and the outcome. In this case, the inferences
are ‘saving the five men is good’ and ‘turning the trolley will cause
the five men to be saved,’ respectively. This is followed by valence
transference, in which psychological value transfers via the causal
link from the goal to the action (‘turning the trolley is good’);
lastly culminating in deontic bridging, where the value transforms
into a deontic operator and a new normative rule is created –
the ‘ought’ conclusion (‘turning the trolley is permissible,’ or even
‘you ought to turn the trolley’).
The conclusions normally match the utility of the outcome,
and the strength of the inference is determined by the strength
of the causal link between action and outcome. For example,
suppose Sue is packing for a safari holiday abroad but is worried
about malaria. Given the premise ‘If Sue takes malaria prevention
pills, she will be less in danger of catching malaria,’ participants
tend to infer that Sue should take the pills. This conclusion is
withdrawn, however, when reasoners are told that the pills are
fakes and contain no more than sugar; in other words, when
a disabler (Cummins et al., 1991; Cummins, 1995) weakens the
causal link between action and outcome. Disablers are reasons
why no outcome occurs even though the cause is present: in
this case, the fake pills, which make it possible that Sue is
still unprotected from malaria even though she took the pills.
Disablers mean that the cause is no longer sufficient to bring
about the effect (Thompson, 1994, 2000). We found (Elqayam
et al., 2015) that when the causal link is disrupted, people avoid
drawing deontic conclusions. There is a clear parallel to moral
judgment here: we know that causality and moral judgment are
strongly linked (Sloman et al., 2009; Sloman and Lagnado, 2015;
Holyoak and Powell, 2016).
The effect also throws into relief another important feature of
deontic introduction: it is, like other types of informal inference,
defeasible (Byrne, 1989; Oaksford and Chater, 1998). This means
that additional premises make people suppress the conclusion:
ceteris paribus, people infer that Sue should take the pills, but not
when they are told that the pills are fake. Deontic introduction
can be defeated with added premises that suppress any of the
implicit inference steps necessary for chaining ‘is’ to ‘ought.’
Moral judgment, too, is defeasible, as philosophers pointed
out (Horty, 1994). Empirical work specifically demonstrating
defeasibility is rather sparse, but recent evidence shows that legal
arguments, at least, are defeasible (Gazzo Castañeda and Knauff,
2016). Defeasibility also fits with what Holyoak and Powell (2016)
called ‘bidirectional inferences’ – the way that people revise their
estimates of causes, intentions, moral rules, consequences, and
even emotions, to retrofit them to their moral judgments. Such
bidirectional inferences draw on the inherent defeasibility of the
inferences in moral judgment and extend them. Although much
traditional psychological research on reasoning focused on static
inference, which is from fixed premises, more attention is now
being given to belief revision or updating. This is the result of
defeasible dynamic reasoning, in which the premises can become
more or less probable or acceptable. Indeed, belief updating
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FIGURE 1 | Processing model for deontic introduction. Illustrations from the trolley problem in italics. Adapted from: Elqayam et al. (2015). Copyright 2015 American
Psychological Association.
and dynamic reasoning are fundamental to the new Bayesian
approaches to the study of reasoning (Oaksford and Chater, 2007,
2013). As we acquire new evidence, or more broadly information,
we revise the beliefs we rely on for premises and the conclusions
we draw from them.
In conclusion, purely on the level of task analysis, there are
striking parallels between what we know about moral judgment
and what we know about deontic introduction: both call on
decision makers to draw deontic (normative) conclusions from
descriptions and premises; both are sensitive to the causal
structure of the narrative; and both can be suppressed and
revised.
DEONTIC INTRODUCTION AND MORAL
JUDGMENT
In utilitarian as in deontological moral judgment, decision
makers need to draw deontic, normative conclusions from
descriptive premises. However, there is one obvious difference
in the process. Deontological moral judgment, by definition,
draws on pre-existing moral norms primed by the vignette;
for example, the trolley problem primes something along the
lines of thou shalt not kill. In contrast, utilitarian judgment,
also by definition, requires the decision maker to assess and
compare the consequences of each course of action, then draw a
tailor-made normative conclusion. What reasoners do when they
draw deontic introduction conclusions is in essence the same:
they assess the consequences of the action and draw normative
conclusions. It is just that moral dilemmas are more complicated
than the typical vignettes used in our previous study of deontic
introduction, because there are two optional courses of action
and the results for each need to be compared. This is not
the case, however, for deontological judgment, where decision
makers need not calculate the outcome of the action – just
the action’s own inherent value, based on that primed moral
norm. Prima facie, then, it seems that deontic introduction is
more closely associated with utilitarian moral judgment than
with the deontological sort. In contrast, how strongly the action
primes a relevant moral norm would determine the strength of
deontological judgment.
Based on this analysis, we propose a dissociation hypothesis,
in which deontic introduction exclusively coheres with utilitarian
(but not with deontological) moral judgment. We use the
term ‘exclusive coherence’ to refer to a dual pattern, in
which deontic introduction associates with utilitarian moral
judgment, but dissociates with deontological moral judgment.
We expected exclusive coherence to be articulated as a selective
defeasibility pattern, in which experimental manipulations known
to suppress deontic introduction should suppress utilitarian but
not deontological moral judgment. In other words, selective
defeasibility is our way to operationalize the dissociation
hypothesis. Note that we do not predict a double dissociation,
that is, we do not think that priming a deontological norm would
affect deontological judgment but not utilitarian judgment.
This is because moral norms carry social and symbolic utility,
which may come into consequentialist calculations as well.
Moreover, our dissociation hypothesis cannot be derived from
any other existing theory. For example, Holyoak and Powell’s
(2016) deontological coherence framework argues that ‘the
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inputs to moral judgment processes are intertwined rather than
dissociated’ (p. 1193). We discuss the contrasting predictions of
this framework in the “General Discussion.”
To test our dissociation hypothesis, we needed to be
able to measure utilitarian moral judgment separately from
deontological moral judgment. There are well-known issues with
the trolley-type paradigm (Cushman and Young, 2011; Fried,
2012; Gold et al., 2014); for the purposes of the current study,
our main concern was the forced-choice response paradigm,
which confounds action and inaction, and does not allow separate
measures of utilitarian and deontological moral judgment. To
measure utilitarian and deontological responses independently,
we developed a novel experimental paradigm suitable to testing
our hypotheses, which we describe in the following section. Two
experiments used this paradigm to test our hypotheses.
SEPARATING UTILITARIAN FROM
DEONTOLOGICAL MEASURES: THE
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
The Four Tasks
Recall that our main hypothesis was that the same factors
that affect deontic introduction will affect utilitarian moral
judgment, but not deontological moral judgment. We therefore
needed separate measures for utilitarian and deontological moral
judgment. We measured deontic introduction using a utilitarian
inference task. We also introduced a parallel deontological
inference task. To avoid omission bias (the tendency to prefer
inaction to action; see, e.g., Ritov and Baron, 1990; Cushman
and Young, 2011) and the action/inaction confound, participants
were asked to rate a deontological action. This paradigm allowed
us to create orthogonal measures for utilitarian and deontological
moral judgments, as well as utilitarian and deontological
normative inferences.
Each item in each task started with a vignette describing a
moral dilemma, with a conflict between a utilitarian outcome
and a deontological obligation. Participants were then presented
with a utility conditional portraying an action leading to a
positive outcome. For example, an anthropologist works with a
sect whose members suffer from scurvy because their religion
severely limits their fruit and vegetables intake. Persuading them
to diversify their diet would reduce the scurvy but offend their
religious beliefs. Participants were then presented with a utility
conditional, ‘If Ben gets the sect members to eat more fruit
and vegetables, he will save them from vitamin C deficiency.’
Each of the four tasks presented the same vignettes and utility
conditionals, but with different tasks, depicted in Table 1.
Participants had to fill in all four tasks, presented in individually
randomized blocks. Thus, each individual saw each of the three
vignettes four times, each time followed by a different task.
Utilitarian Inference
To measure deontic introduction we used a utilitarian inference
task (depicted on the upper-left quadrant of Table 1). A variation
of the experimental task developed for deontic introduction
(Elqayam et al., 2015), it started with the vignette and utility
conditional. Participants were then instructed to rate conclusions
such as ‘Ben should get the sect members to eat more fruit and
vegetables.’ There were six conclusions, each with a different
deontic operator (‘must,’ ‘must-not,’ ‘should,’ ‘should-not,’ ‘may,’
‘need-not’). Participants were instructed to rate how strongly
each conclusion followed from the vignettes and the conditional
premise, on a fully labeled 1–7 Likert-type scale running from
‘Definitely does not follow’ (1) to ‘Definitely follows’ (7). As far
as we are aware, this is a first in terms of testing separately a wide
range of deontic operators in moral dilemmas.
Note that the task is deontic but not deontological: it is deontic
in the sense of deontic logic: it requires participants to infer
deontic, normative conclusions (must, should, etc.). However, it
is not deontological in the sense of moral judgment, because it
does not draw on Kantian ‘hot’ moral judgment.
Deontological Inference
To measure how people draw deontological conclusions, we
designed a deontological inference task (see upper-right quadrant
of Table 1), in which we asked participants to rate conclusions
with the same six deontic operators, but in regard to the
deontological course of action. Participants were again presented
with the same vignettes and utility conditional as in the utilitarian
inference task, but rated different conclusions. For example, in
the scurvy scenario, participants were asked to rate conclusions
such as ‘Ben should respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members,’ using the same scale, from ‘Definitely does not follow’
to ‘Definitely follows.’ This task is both deontic and deontological:
participants are called to draw conclusions containing deontic
operators about a course of action underpinned by deontological
(Kantian) considerations.
Utilitarian Moral Rightness
To measure moral judgment directly, we designed a utilitarian
moral rightness task (see lower-left quadrant of Table 1), in which
participants were presented with the same vignettes and utility
conditionals as in the other tasks, and instructed to rate whether
the utilitarian action was morally right or wrong; e.g., ‘Is it
morally right or wrong for Ben to get the sect members to eat more
fruit and vegetables?’ Responses were made on a Likert-type scale
from 1 (‘Entirely morally wrong’) to 7 (‘Entirely morally right’).
Deontological Moral Rightness
Lastly, the lower-right quadrant of Table 1 depicts our
deontological moral rightness task, the deontological equivalent of
the utilitarian moral judgment task. Participants were presented
with the same vignettes and utility conditionals, and asked to
rate the deontological course of action (for example, ‘Is it morally
right or wrong for Ben to respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members?’), using the same scale, from ‘Entirely morally wrong’
to ‘Entirely morally right.’
Defeasibility Manipulations
In two experiments, we capitalized on the defeasible nature of
deontic introduction to introduce suppression manipulations.
We used three types of suppression as explained below: (a)
normative conflict was used in both experiments; (b) goal conflict
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TABLE 1 | The four tasks of the experimental paradigm.
Vignette and utility conditional
Ben is an anthropologist working with a religious sect in rural America. He gradually realizes that many of his informants suffer from joint pains, bleeding gums, and they
bruise easily. He discovers that the sect’s religious beliefs severely limit their fruit and vegetables intake. The result is that many of them suffer from debilitating vitamin C
deficiency (scurvy). Ben considers persuading them to eat more fruit and vegetables.
If Ben gets the sect members to eat more fruit and vegetables, he will save them from vitamin C deficiency.
Utilitarian tasks Deontological tasks
Inference tasks Question Utilitarian inference task
Does it then follow:
Ben must get the sect members to eat more fruit and
vegetables
Ben must not get the sect members to eat more fruit and
vegetables
Ben should get the sect members to eat more fruit and
vegetables
Ben should not get the sect members to eat more fruit
and vegetables
Ben may get the sect members to eat more fruit and
vegetables
Ben need not get the sect members to eat more fruit and
vegetables
Deontological inference task
Does it then follow:
Ben must respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members
Ben must not respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members
Ben should respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members
Ben should not respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members
Ben may respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members
Ben need not respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members
Scale 1-Definitely does not follow←→ 7-Definitely follows
Moral rightness tasks Question Utilitarian moral rightness task Is it morally right or
wrong for Ben to get the sect members to eat more fruit
and vegetables?
Deontological moral rightness task Is it morally right or
wrong for Ben to respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members?
Scale 1-Entirely morally wrong←→ 7-Entirely morally right
Illustrations are taken from the scurvy scenario. All participants received the four tasks.
was used in Experiment 1; and (c) causal suppression was
used in Experiment 2. Such suppressions should block deontic
introduction by interfering with various links in the implicit
inference chain presented in Figure 1, which leads from the
descriptive premises to the deontic conclusions; and indeed, there
is evidence that all three suppression manipulations attenuate
deontic introduction conclusions (Elqayam et al., 2015). Thus,
they should affect utilitarian, but not deontological judgments.
Overall this should result in a consistent pattern of interactions,
in which utilitarian, but not deontological dependent measures,
vary between levels of the manipulated variable (more on this in
the section on hypotheses and predictions). All suppressions were
manipulated between participants, such that participants were
randomly assigned to one of four (in Experiment 1) or six (in
Experiment 2) manipulation cells. Each participant was presented
with three vignettes in each of the four tasks.
Normative Conflict
In both experiments of the current study, we directly manipulated
the salience of the normative conflict between utilitarian
outcome and deontological obligation, by either introducing or
withholding additional text to the effect that the action violates
a relevant professional code of practice; for example, in the
scurvy vignette, participants in the high-conflict condition were
presented with the following additional text:
However, this would be against their religion. The code of practice of
the Anthropological Association requires anthropologists to respect
the beliefs of their informants.
We note that in moral dilemmas, conflict is inherent in the
very structure of the narrative, and thus impossible to eliminate
entirely; it can, however, be either highlighted or downplayed.
Normative conflict interferes with deontic bridging,
the transmutation of valence to a deontic conclusion, by
introducing a normative rule to the opposite, thus blocking
the implicit inference from ‘good’ to ‘should.’ In this case,
the inference that Ben should get the sect members to eat
more fruit and vegetables is blocked by the opposite norm,
namely, that Ben should respect the sect’s religious beliefs,
producing the inference that Ben should not get the sect
members to eat more fruit and vegetables. In Elqayam et al.
(2015), when participants were given additional premises
that presented a normative conflict, deontic introduction was
suppressed.
Even though the high-conflict manipulation highlights the
deontological imperative, we expected deontological responses
to be less affected than utilitarian responses, because the
cues to trigger deontological responses are already embedded
in the vignette. Since deontological judgment is absolute
rather than contingent on the context, we did not expect
the effects of the vignette and the additional cue to be
additive.
Goal Conflict
Experiment 1 also manipulated goal conflict, by introducing
utility conditionals with the same antecedents but negative
instead of positive outcomes. For example, participants in the
goal suppression condition received this additional text for the
scurvy vignette:
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However, the sect members suffer from a rare form of allergy to fruit
and vegetables. If Ben gets the sect members to eat more fruit and
vegetables, it will drive them into severe, life-threatening allergic
reaction.
The theoretical rationale is that goal conflict interferes with
valence transference from action to outcome, the penultimate
step in the inference chain depicted in Figure 1. This is the
implicit inference that getting the sect members to eat more
fruit and vegetables is good. This inference is blocked, because
additional text invites the opposite inference, that getting the
sect members to eat more fruit and vegetables is bad. A similar
manipulation in Elqayam et al. (2015) significantly attenuated
deontic introduction conclusions.
Causal suppression
In Experiment 2, we manipulated a different type of suppression,
taken from the beginning of the inference chain depicted in
Figure 1 – causality. Experiment 2 manipulated two types of
causal suppression, disablers and alternative causes. Disablers are
reasons why the effect does not happen even when the cause
exists; they undermine the sufficiency of the cause to the effect
(Cummins et al., 1991; Thompson, 1994, 2000; Cummins, 1995).
Alternative causes are reasons why the effect can occur even in the
absence of the cause; they undermine the necessity of the cause to
the effect. In Experiment 2, participants in the control condition
were presented with an additional text that emphasized both
necessity and sufficiency of the action to the outcome, whereas
participants in the suppression conditions were presented with
an additional text that included disablers or alternative causes.
For example:
Causal enhancement: The sect members also avoid any
medication or food supplements. The only way to save them
from vitamin C deficiency is to get them to eat more fruit
and vegetables. Research shows that people with vitamin C
deficiency only need to eat fruit and vegetables in order to
recover very quickly.
Sufficiency suppression (disablers): However, it is not enough
for Ben to get the sect members to eat more fruit and vegetables.
Their staple food is a local type of shellfish, which contains a
substance that does not allow the body to absorb vitamin C at
all.
Necessity suppression (alternative causes): However, it is not
necessary for Ben to get the sect members to eat more fruit
and vegetables. He can also advise them to eat more beef liver,
which contains plenty of vitamin C, and is not against the sect’s
beliefs.
Deontic introduction theory postulates that a crucial part of
the implicit inference chain leading to a deontic conclusion is
the construction of a causal model (Sloman, 2005) linking the
action to the outcome. When participants were given additional
information which defeats the causal link, such as disablers or
alternative causes, deontic introduction was attenuated (Elqayam
et al., 2015). The central role that causality plays in moral
judgment is well-established (see Sloman et al., 2009; Sloman and
Lagnado, 2015, for reviews), but previous work focused mainly
on the type of causal model rather than the strength of the causal
link. We are not aware of any previous empirical work that
introduced causal defeaters in a moral judgment study.
Hypotheses and Predictions
Recall that we had a dissociation hypothesis, in which deontic
introduction exclusively coheres with utilitarian but not with
deontological moral judgment; that is, we expect deontic
introduction to be associated with utilitarian moral judgment,
but dissociated with deontological moral judgment. From
this, we derive a selective defeasibility hypothesis: Experimental
manipulations known to suppress deontic introduction should
suppress both utilitarian inference and utilitarian moral rightness
ratings, but not deontological inference and deontological moral
rightness ratings. From these hypotheses we derive several
specific predictions.
We expected two-way interactions between the manipulated
variables and moral judgment, such that the moral rightness of
the utilitarian action, but not of the deontological action, would
be rated lower under test conditions known to suppress deontic
introduction: high normative conflict, goal suppression, disabling
conditions, or alternative causes. These predictions articulate our
selective defeasibility hypothesis, that conditions that suppress
deontic introduction suppress utilitarian, but not deontological
moral judgment. As the selective defeasibility hypothesis only
dictates predictions for each suppression factor, we left open
as an exploratory hypothesis the question whether suppression
variables interact – that is, whether there would be three-way
interactions.
Similarly, we expected three-way interactions between
the manipulated variables and inference strength, such that
utilitarian but not deontological inference strength would
be attenuated under test conditions known to affect deontic
introduction (high normative conflict, goal suppression,
disabling conditions, or alternative causes): inference strength
of conclusions with positive modal operators such as ‘must’
and ‘should’ was predicted to be rated lower, whereas inference
strength of conclusions with negative modal operators such as
‘must-not’ and ‘should-not’ was predicted to be rated higher –
that is, closer to mid-scale. As was the case for moral judgment,
we left open the question of higher-order (in this case, four-way)
interaction, because we had no reason to expect the suppression
variables to interact or not to interact.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we manipulated normative conflict and goal
conflict. As explained in the previous section, goal conflict was
manipulated by introducing negative outcomes of the utilitarian
action, a manipulation intended to block the inference that
the action is good. Normative conflict was either kept low, or
highlighted by telling participants about a professional code of
conduct which creates conflict with the utilitarian action.
If our dissociation and selective defeasibility hypotheses are
correct, both manipulations should affect utilitarian inference
and utilitarian moral rightness rating, but not the deontological
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measures from the right-hand half of Table 1: rating of moral
rightness of the utilitarian (but not deontological) course of
action should be lower in the suppression conditions (i.e., goal
suppression, high normative conflict) relative to control, and
ratings of utilitarian inference (but not deontological inference)
strength should be attenuated, with conclusions with positive
operators rated lower, and conclusions with negative operators
rated higher (i.e., closer to mid-scale).
Method
Participants
A total of 116 participants took part in an online study using
the crowd sourcing platform CrowdFlower and were paid a
small sum for their participation. All of the participants had
a good record of responding appropriately to quality control
questions on other CrowdFlower micro jobs. Responses from
21 participants who were non-native speakers of English or
dyslexic, failed to sign the informed consent, or failed a
validation question1 were excluded from analysis, resulting in
a sample of 95, of which 25 were in the low-conflict, no
goal suppression condition; 18 were in the low-conflict, goal
suppression condition; 28 were in the high-conflict, no goal
suppression condition; and 24 were in the high-conflict, goal
suppression condition. There were no significant differences
between these four groups in sex, age, or level of education. The
attrition rate (18%) is comparable to other web studies, and,
importantly, there were no significant differences in attrition on
the quality control measures between the four experimental test
conditions. Participants in the excluded group were significantly
younger than the ones in the included group [M = 28.1 vs.
M = 37.2, respectively; t(69) = 5.1, p < 0.001], but did not
significantly differ in their reported level of education.
Materials and Procedure
Each participant was presented with the four tasks of the
study in individually randomized order: utilitarian inference,
deontological inference, utilitarian moral rightness, and
deontological moral rightness, as described in the experimental
paradigm section. Each task contained one practice item and
three individually randomized test items, all presented on the
same webpage. The same three items (vignettes and utility
conditionals) were presented in all four tasks, and all participants
were presented with all items. A full list of items can be found in
Appendix A.
Design
For moral rightness ratings, we used a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed
design, with normative conflict (low normative conflict vs. high
normative conflict) and goal conflict (goal suppression vs. no goal
suppression) as the between-participants independent variables,
and type of moral judgment (utilitarian vs. deontological), as
the within-participants independent variable. The dependent
variable was rating of the moral rightness of the action, with
1Taken from Pennycook et al. (2014). At the end of the demographics section,
participants were given a list of hobbies and instructed: “If you are reading these
instructions please write ‘I read the instructions’ in the ‘other’ box.”
FIGURE 2 | Experiment 1: Mean moral rightness ratings, from 1 (entirely
morally wrong) to 7 (entirely morally right), as a function of type of judgment
and goal conflict condition. Error bars represent 1 SE. The difference between
the goal suppression condition and the no-suppression condition is significant
for utilitarian (solid blue line) but not for deontological (dashed red line)
judgment.
7 (‘entirely morally right’) the highest rating and 1 (‘entirely
morally wrong’) the lowest.
For the inference tasks, we used a 2 × 2 × 2 × 6 mixed
design, with normative conflict (low normative conflict vs.
high normative conflict) and goal conflict (goal suppression vs.
no goal suppression) as the between-participants independent
variables, and type of inference (utilitarian vs. deontological) and
modal operator (‘must,’ ‘must-not,’ ‘should,’ ‘should-not,’ ‘may,’
‘need-not,’ ‘going-to,’ ‘not-going-to’), as the within-participants
independent variables. The dependent variable was rating of how
strongly the conclusion follows, with 7 (‘Definitely follows’) the
highest rating and 1 (‘Definitely does not follow’) the lowest.
Thus, higher ratings indicate that the inferences are judged to be
stronger.
Results and Discussion
Here and throughout this report, we report mean scores
computed across test items. Where sphericity was violated, we
report Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom. For
multiple comparisons we used the Bonferroni correction. We do
not report main effects and lower-order interactions where these
were modified by higher-order interactions.
Moral Rightness
Figure 2 presents mean ratings of moral rightness as a function
of type of moral judgment and goal conflict, and Figure 3
presents mean ratings of moral rightness as a function of
type of moral judgment and normative conflict. To test our
dissociation and selective defeasibility hypotheses, we ran a
2 × 2 × 2 (moral judgment type, normative conflict, and
goal conflict) mixed ANOVA. We found the predicted large
two-way interaction between type of moral judgment and goal
conflict [F(1,91) = 10.2, MSE = 1.96, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.101],
with strong effect size. As predicted, moral judgment of the
utilitarian action was rated less morally right in the goal
suppression condition relative to the no goal suppression
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FIGURE 3 | Experiment 1: Mean moral rightness ratings, from 1 (entirely
morally wrong) to 7 (entirely morally right), as a function of type of judgment
and normative conflict condition. Error bars represent 1 SE. The difference
between the low normative conflict condition and the high normative conflict
condition is significant for utilitarian (solid blue line) but not for deontological
(dashed red line) judgment.
condition. Follow-up t-tests revealed significant differences in
moral rightness rating between the goal suppression condition
and the no goal suppression condition for utilitarian moral
judgment [t(93) = 5.7, p < 0.001] but not for deontological
moral judgment. The predicted interaction between normative
conflict and type of moral judgment was marginal [F(1,91)= 3.8,
MSE = 1.95, p = 0.054, η2p = 0.040], but follow-up t-tests
revealed the expected pattern, that is, there were significant
differences in moral rightness ratings between the low normative
conflict condition and the high normative conflict condition for
utilitarian [t(93) = 2.90, p = 0.005] but not deontological moral
judgment.
Inference Strength
Figure 4 presents mean inference strength ratings as a function
of type of inference, deontic operator and normative conflict,
and Figure 5 presents mean inference strength ratings as a
function of type of inference, deontic operator and goal conflict.
To test our dissociation and selective defeasibility hypotheses,
we ran a 2 × 2 × 2 × 6 (type of inference, normative
conflict, goal conflict, and deontic operator) mixed ANOVA.
We found the predicted three-way interaction between deontic
operator, type of inference, and goal conflict [F(2,137) = 16.5,
MSE = 6.9, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.153], and the predicted three-
way interaction between deontic operator, type of inference, and
normative conflict [F(2,137) = 10.3, MSE = 6.9, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.101].
As predicted, conclusions with positive modal deontic
operators were rated as following more strongly when normative
conflict was low relative to the high-conflict condition, and the
opposite was true for conclusions with negative modal deontic
operators. As illustrated in Figure 4, this effect only held for
utilitarian inference, whereas deontological inference conclusion
ratings were unaffected by normative conflict. Follow-up t-tests
revealed significant differences in ratings of inference strength
between the low- versus high-normative conflict condition for
all utilitarian deontic operators [t(93) ≥ 2.7, p ≤ 0.008] except
‘may,’ which was marginal given the number of comparisons2
[t(92) = 2.3, p = 0.022]; but no significant differences for the
deontological deontic operators.
Similarly and again as predicted, conclusions with positive
modal deontic operators were rated as following more strongly
under the no goal suppression condition relative to the
goal suppression condition whereas the opposite was true
for conclusions with negative deontic operators, as can be
seen in Figure 5. Again this effect only held for utilitarian
inference, whereas deontological inference conclusions were not
significantly affected by suppression. Follow-up t-tests revealed
significant differences in inference strength rating between the
goal suppression condition and the no goal suppression condition
for all utilitarian deontic operators [t(93)≥ 3.3, p≤ 0.001] except
‘may’; and for none of the deontological inference conclusions
except ‘should not,’ which was marginal given the number of
comparisons [t(93) = 2.0, p = 0.046]. No other effects were
significant.3
The results of Experiment 1 support our dissociation and
selective defeasibility hypotheses. In particular, effects of goal
conflict were selective in exactly the expected pattern. Utilitarian
inference was suppressed when participants were presented
with negative consequences of the utilitarian action, with no
significant suppression effects on deontological inference. The
pattern was the same in the moral judgment tasks: the utilitarian
course of action was rated as less morally right when the goal
was suppressed, but the deontological course of action was
not significantly affected. We found a corresponding pattern
with the normative conflict manipulation. Here, too, utilitarian
inference, but not deontological inference, was significantly
suppressed when participants were presented with a high degree
of normative conflict, with a parallel effect in moral rightness, in
which the utilitarian course of action was rated as less morally
right when the normative conflict was high, but the deontological
course of action was not significantly affected.
As an aside, it is worth pointing out that out of the six deontic
operators we measured, suppression effects were weakest for the
one most closely associated with moral judgment – the deontic
operator ‘may,’ which denotes permissibility. Experimental
paradigms which focus solely on permissibility as a measure of
moral judgment, then, might be in danger of committing a type-
II error, as they reject hypotheses that might have been supported
had they used other, more sensitive deontic operators.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 established the pattern we predicted: utilitarian
moral judgment and utilitarian inference were both affected by
2Bonferroni 0.05/6= 0.008.
3Following a reviewer’s suggestion, we collapsed all positive operators versus
all negative operators and ran an additional 2 × 2 ANOVA with type of
operator (positive vs. negative) and normative conflict condition (high vs. low)
as the within- and between-participants independent variables, respectively, and
inference strength as the dependent variable. The operator × normative conflict
interaction was not significant, F(1,93) = 1.3, p = 0.25; contrast estimate 0.468;
95% CI [−0.336, 1.272].
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FIGURE 4 | Experiment 1: Mean conclusion ratings, from 1 (Definitely does not follow) to 7 (Definitely follows), as a function of deontic operator, type of inference and
normative conflict condition. Error bars represent 1 SE. The difference between the low normative conflict and the high normative conflict condition is significant for
all ratings of utilitarian inference strength except ‘may,’ and for none of the ratings of deontological inference strength.
the same factors, while deontological judgment and deontological
inference remained largely unaffected, thus supporting our
dissociation hypothesis as operationalized in our selective
defeasibility hypothesis. In Experiment 2, we manipulated a
different type of suppression – causality, suppressing an earlier
part of the inference chain depicted in Figure 1. If the dissociation
hypothesis is correct, then weakening the causal link between the
action and the outcome should affect utilitarian inference as well
as utilitarian moral judgment, but not deontological inference
and deontological moral judgment. In other words, we expected
to conceptually replicate the results of Experiment 1, but with
a very different type of defeater. Such correspondence would
lend further support to our dissociation and selective defeasibility
hypotheses.
Method
Participants
A total of 235 participants took part in an online study using
the crowd sourcing platform CrowdFlower and were paid a
small sum for their participation. All of the participants had
a good record of responding appropriately to quality control
questions on other CrowdFlower micro jobs. Responses from 47
participants who were non-native speakers of English, dyslexic,
failed to sign the informed consent, or failed the validation
question were excluded from analysis, resulting in a sample
of 188, of which 29 were in the high normative conflict,
enhanced causality condition; 34 were in the low normative
conflict, enhanced causality condition; 33 were in the high
normative conflict, disablers condition; 25 were in the low
normative conflict, disablers condition; 34 were in the high
normative conflict, alternative causes condition; and 33 were in
the low normative conflict, alternative causes condition. As in
Experiment 1, there were no significant differences between these
six groups in terms of sex, age, or reported level of education.
Also as in Experiment 1, the attrition rate (20%) is comparable
to other web studies, and, importantly, there were no significant
differences in attrition on the quality control measures between
the six experimental test conditions. Participants in the excluded
group did not significantly differ from the included group in their
age or their reported level of education.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were as in Experiment 1, but
without the goal conflict manipulation. This was replaced with
a causality manipulation, with three between-participants test
conditions: disablers (sufficiency suppression), alternative causes
(necessity suppression), and control (enhanced causality). All
materials were pretested on a separate sample taken from the
same population as the main study (n = 71). Participants in
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FIGURE 5 | Experiment 1: Mean conclusion ratings, from 1 (Definitely does not follow) to 7 (Definitely follows), as a function of deontic operator, type of inference and
goal conflict condition. Error bars represent 1 SE. The difference between the goal suppression and the no goal suppression condition is significant for all ratings of
utilitarian inference strength except ‘may,’ and for none of the ratings of deontological inference strength.
the pretest study were asked to rate separately the necessity and
sufficiency of the action to the outcome on a 1–7 scale. The items,
along with the relevant means of necessity and sufficiency, are
reported in Appendix B.
Design
As in Experiment 1, except that suppression by goal conflict was
replaced with causal suppression, with three levels (enhanced
causality vs. disablers vs. alternative causes), manipulated
between-participants.
Results and Discussion
The results broadly replicated those of Experiment 1, with the
causal suppression conditions replicating the effects found in the
goal suppression conditions.
Moral Rightness
Figure 6 presents mean ratings of moral rightness as a function
of type of moral judgment and causal suppression, and Figure 7
presents mean ratings of moral rightness as a function of moral
judgment type and normative conflict. To test our dissociation
and selective defeasibility hypotheses, we ran a 2 × 2 × 3 (moral
judgment type, normative conflict, and causal suppression)
mixed ANOVA. We found the predicted two-way interaction
between type of moral judgment and causal suppression
[F(2,154) = 3.78, MSE = 2.29, p = 0.025, η2p = 0.047], with
FIGURE 6 | Experiment 2: Mean moral rightness ratings, from 1 (entirely
morally wrong) to 7 (entirely morally right), as a function of type of judgment
and causal suppression condition. Error bars represent 1 SE.
moderate effect size. As predicted, the utilitarian action was
rated less morally right in the causal suppression conditions
relative to enhanced causality condition. Planned comparisons
contrasting the enhanced causality condition with each of the
causal suppression conditions, respectively, revealed significant
differences in moral rightness rating between the enhanced
causality condition and the disabler condition for utilitarian
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FIGURE 7 | Experiment 2: Mean moral rightness ratings, from 1 (entirely
morally wrong) to 7 (entirely morally right), as a function of type of judgment
and normative conflict condition. Error bars represent 1 SE.
moral judgment [t(159) = 2.4, p = 0.017], although the
difference between the enhanced causality condition and the
alternative causes condition was borderline given the number of
comparisons [t(159)= 2.1, p= 0.038]. Ratings of moral rightness
of the deontological action did not differ significantly between
the enhanced causality condition and the causal suppression
conditions (p ≥ 0.06).
We also found a two-way interaction between type of moral
judgment and normative conflict [F(1,154) = 10.8, MSE = 2.29,
p = .001, η2p = 0.065], in which judgment of moral rightness of
the utilitarian action was higher in the low normative conflict
condition, and the opposite was true of the moral rightness of the
deontological action. Follow-up t-tests revealed both effects to be
significant [t(159) = 3.5, p = 0.001; and t(160) = 2.3, p = 0.025,
respectively].
Inference Strength
Figure 8 presents mean ratings of inference strength as a function
of type of inference, deontic operator and causal suppression,
and Figure 9 presents mean ratings of inference strength as a
function of type of inference, deontic operator and normative
conflict. To test our dissociation and defeasibility hypotheses, we
ran a 2× 2× 3× 6 (type of inference, normative conflict, causal
suppression, and deontic operator) mixed ANOVA. We found
the predicted three-way interaction between deontic operator,
type of inference, and causal suppression [F(4,278) = 5.1,
MSE = 1.9, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.062], as well as a three-way
interaction between deontic operator, type of inference, and
normative conflict [F(2,277) = 37.0, MSE = 1.9, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.195].
As expected, conclusions with positive modal deontic
operators were rated as less strongly following when causality
was suppressed by alternative causes or disablers relative
to the enhanced causality condition, and the opposite was
true for conclusions with negative deontic operators, but, as
illustrated in Figure 8, this effect only held for utilitarian
inference, whereas deontological inference conclusions were not
significantly affected. Planned contrasts revealed, for utilitarian
inference, significant differences in ratings of inference strength
between the enhanced causality condition and the disablers
condition for the deontic operators ‘must,’ ‘must not,’ ‘should-not,’
and ‘need-not’ [t(158)≥ 2.7, p≤ 0.008], and marginal differences
(given the number of comparisons) for the deontic operator
‘should’ [t(158) = 2.5, p = 0.013]. In contrast, deontological
inference ratings were largely unaffected, with no significant
differences for five out of six deontic operators. The two
exceptions were ‘should’ [t(158) = 2.9, p = 0.004], and ‘must,’
with a marginal difference given the number of comparisons
[t(158)= 2.0, p= 0.049].
The effect was similar, although slightly less robust, for the
differences between the enhanced causality condition and the
alternative causes condition. For utilitarian inference, planned
contrasts revealed marginal differences, given the number of
comparisons, in ratings of inference strength between the
enhanced causality condition and the alternative causes condition
for the deontic operators ‘must’ [t(158) = 2.4, p = 0.017] and
‘should not’ [t(158) = 2.4, p = 0.020]. Deontological inference
ratings were unaffected, with no significant or even marginal
differences for any of the six deontic operators.
We also found a three-way interaction between normative
conflict, deontic operator, and type of inference, illustrated in
Figure 9, although it took a somewhat different form than
expected. For utilitarian inference, we replicated the results
of Experiment 1, with inference strength ratings of positive
operators going up in the low normative conflict condition, and
inference strength ratings of negative operators going down.
However, unlike Experiment 1, in which deontological inference
was unaffected, in this experiment deontological inference was
affected in the opposite direction to that of utilitarian inference,
with inference strength ratings of negative operators going up
in the low normative conflict condition, and inference strength
ratings of the positive operator ‘must’ going down in the
low normative conflict condition. Follow-up t-tests revealed
significant differences between the high normative conflict and
the low normative conflict condition for all deontic operators in
both types of inference [t(158) ≥ 3.8, p < 0.001]. The exceptions
were utilitarian and deontological inference conclusions with
‘should,’ and deontological inference conclusions with ‘may,’ in
which differences were not significant; and the deontological
inference with ‘must not’ which was marginal given the number
of comparisons [t(158)= 2.7, p= 0.009].4
Our manipulation of causal strength provided solid support
for our dissociation and selective defeasibility hypotheses. The
effects of causal suppression, and those of sufficiency suppression
in particular, replicated the effects of goal suppression from
Experiment 1 with a very similar level of selectivity. Utilitarian
inference, but not deontological inference, was attenuated when
sufficiency (and to some extent, necessity) was suppressed, with
4Following a reviewer’s suggestion, we collapsed all positive operators versus
all negative operators and ran an additional 2 × 2 ANOVA with type of
operator (positive vs. negative) and normative conflict condition (high vs. low)
as the within- and between-participants independent variables, respectively, and
inference strength as the dependent variable. The operator × normative conflict
interaction was significant, F(1,160) = 23.5, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.128; contrast
estimate 1.22, 95% CI [−1.71,−0.72].
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FIGURE 8 | Experiment 2: Mean conclusion ratings, from 1 (Definitely does not follow) to 7 (Definitely follows), as a function of deontic operator, type of inference and
causal suppression condition. Error bars represent 1 SE.
a parallel effect on moral rightness, in which the utilitarian
course of action was rated as less morally right when the goal
was suppressed, but the deontological course of action was not
significantly affected.
For utilitarian judgments, the normative conflict
manipulation provided a clear replication of Experiment 1,
in which conclusions with positive deontic operators were
rated as stronger in the low-conflict relative to the high-conflict
condition. Unexpectedly, it also affected deontological judgment,
albeit in the opposite way. Our interpretation of these findings
is that conflict manipulation, by definition, creates an explicit
competition between the utilitarian course of action and the
deontological one. One can take either the utilitarian action (e.g.,
get the sect members to eat more fruit and vegetables), or the
deontological action (e.g., respect the sect members’ religious
beliefs). It is impossible to do both. Conflict focuses attention on
the contrast between the deontological and utilitarian actions,
and so may increase people’s sensitivity to it. Participants might
have become more aware of the conflict in Experiment 2 relative
to Experiment 1 due to the way that the causality manipulation
in Experiment 2 highlighting the causal path of the recipient
rather than that of the actor, a manipulation known to strengthen
deontological responding (Waldmann and Dieterich, 2007).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Faced with a description of an action with a good or bad
outcome, people readily infer normative (‘deontic’) conclusions.
Thus, if fruit and vegetables are what will save the sect
members from scurvy, then Ben should get them to eat more
fruit and vegetables. The ‘will’ is descriptive; the ‘should’ is
normative, or in logical terms, deontic. This type of inference
(dubbed ‘deontic introduction’ in previous work) allows humans
to generate novel normative and moral rules where none
existed before. In this paper, we set out to explore the role
of deontic introduction in moral judgment, and in particular
the type of moral judgment that relies on calculating the
costs and benefits of the consequences of one’s actions –
utilitarian, or consequentialist moral judgment. We expected
deontic introduction to cohere exclusively with utilitarian but
not with deontological moral judgment. Thus, the moral
rightness of Ben’s getting the sect members to eat more fruit
and vegetables is associated with the descriptive-to-normative
inference that this is what Ben should (must and may) do.
In contrast, the moral rightness of Ben respecting the sect
members’ religious beliefs (hence not getting them to eat
more fruit and vegetables) is relatively independent of such
inference.
In two experiments, we used a range of suppression
manipulations, including causal suppression, goal conflict, and
normative conflict. Across these disparate manipulations, we
found very similar patterns of selective defeasibility. When
utilitarian inference (which measured deontic introduction) was
suppressed, so was the perceived moral rightness of the utilitarian
course of action. If a normative conflict led people to believe
that getting the sect members to eat more fruit and vegetables
would be offensive to their beliefs, they stopped inferring
that Ben should get the sect members to eat more fruit and
vegetables, and in parallel, they also thought such action less
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FIGURE 9 | Experiment 2: Mean conclusion ratings, from 1 (Definitely does not follow) to 7 (Definitely follows), as a function of deontic operator, type of inference and
normative conflict condition. Error bars represent 1 SE.
morally right. A similar thing happened when goal conflict
led participants to believe that getting the sect members to
eat more fruit and vegetables would result in a bad outcome
(massive allergic reaction); and again when causal suppression
led participants to believe that eating more fruit and vegetables
was insufficient for overcoming scurvy (because the sect’s staple
food blocked vitamin C from absorbing); or that eating fruit and
vegetables was unnecessary (because they could get vitamin C
from animal liver). In most cases this suppression pattern was
highly selective: inference strength and moral rightness of the
utilitarian action were significantly affected, whereas inference
strength and moral rightness of the deontological action were
much less affected, or, in one case, affected in the opposite
direction. The consistency of the selective pattern across so
many manipulations is at least suggestive. Thus, we have a
good level of support for our dissociation hypothesis, that
deontic introduction exclusively coheres with utilitarian moral
judgment – that is, that deontic introduction is associated with
utilitarian moral judgment but dissociated with deontological
moral judgment.
It is noteworthy that the selective suppression pattern
occurred even though, by the very nature of moral dilemmas, the
two courses of action are mutually and logically contradictory.
Thus, if one must respect the religious beliefs of the sect
members, then one must not try to get them to eat more
fruit and vegetables, and vice versa; and if it is permissible
to get them to eat more fruit and vegetables, then it is
impermissible to respect their religious beliefs. We seem to
have unearthed a focusing bias, or framing effect, peculiar
to moral dilemmas, that we would never have found with
the usual trolley paradigm. In the classic framing paradigm
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) people become asymmetrically
risk-averse versus risk-seeking, depending on whether the
problem is depicted in terms of gains or losses, respectively;
here, people become asymmetrically action-averse depending on
whether the problem is depicted in utilitarian or deontological
terms.
Holyoak and Powell’s Deontological
Coherence Framework
We noted earlier that no other theory predicts quite the
pattern that we predicted, and supported. One prominent theory
which differs in its predictions is the recent major theoretical
framework, deontological coherence (Holyoak and Powell, 2016).
Although there are some interesting parallels between the
deontological coherence framework and our theory, there are
crucial differences as well, as we now show.
The deontological coherence framework proposes that moral
judgment typically involves multiple factors, some deontological,
some consequential/utilitarian, as well as causal knowledge,
theory of mind, and emotional factors. The result is an
emergent ‘local coherence’ between the outcome of the moral
judgment and the contributing factors. This often leads to
what Holyoak and Powell call ‘bidirectional inferences,’ in
which beliefs, intention attribution and emotions are revised
post-judgment to become more coherent with whatever moral
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judgment was passed. This part of the deontological coherence
framework fits well with the defeasible nature of deontic
introduction, and indeed our own findings show clear support
for bidirectional inference: people indeed revised their moral
judgment when a range of defeaters suppresses their utilitarian
inference.
The deontological coherence framework integrates Cheng and
Holyoak’s (1985) theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas, an
early theory developed to account for reasoning on the Wason
selection task (Wason, 1966). In the standard version of this
task, participants are presented with a conditional rule of the
form if p, then q, e.g., ‘if there is an A on one side of the card,
then there is a 6 on the other side’; and a set of four cards,
each with a letter on one side and a digit on the other side. The
exposed values on the cards match the values of p, not-p, q, and
not-q, respectively; for example, A, F, 6, and 4. Participants are
instructed to turn over the cards – and only the cards – that
would allow them to test if the rule is true or false in respect
to the cards. Only a small minority of participants, typically
around 10%, select the classically normative combination, p and
not-q (A and 4, respectively, in our example). However, this
dramatically changes when the rule is deontic (as Cheng and
Holyoak were the first to identify). For example, in Griggs and
Cox’s (1982) drinking age rule, participants are invited to imagine
that they are a police officer tasked with enforcing a rule ‘If a
person drinks beer, then this person must be over 21 years of
age,’ and the cards (each of which represents a drinker at a bar)
are beer, coke, 22, and 16, respectively. When participants are
instructed to turn over the cards that would allow them to tell of
the rule was being violated, performance improves substantially,
with about 75% of participants choosing the normative beer
and 16 cards (see Evans and Over, 2004, Chapter 5, for a
review).
Cheng and Holyoak’s (1985) theory explained this facilitation
effect by proposing pragmatic reasoning schemas, a set of
generalized, context-sensitive rules defined in terms of goals
and relationship to these goals. Obligations, permissions, and
causations are all types of pragmatic reasoning schemas.
A later development (Holyoak and Cheng, 1995) formalized
such schemas in terms of rights and duties – that is, purely
deontological terms. This is the interpretation that Holyoak and
Powell (2016) draw on to integrate into their theory, arguing that
this suggests that people draw on intuitive deontological concepts
of rights and duties to understand social regulations.
We note, however, that other major theoretical developments
in the field of reasoning have provided a utilitarian rather than
deontological interpretation of the literature on the deontic
selection task. For example, Manktelow and Over (1991)
provided a utilitarian interpretation of perspective effects in the
deontic selection task, demonstrating that different utilities ties
with various social roles drive different patterns of card selection.
Similarly, Oaksford and Chater (1994) suggested a Bayesian
framework for the selection task, which also relies on analysis of
utilities.
Nevertheless, we find much to admire in the deontological
coherence framework. One very important feature relates to
the methodological atheism which underlies the deontological
coherence framework. Holyoak and Powel argue that, since there
is no widely accepted normative standard for moral judgment,
attempts to regard as psychologically inferior any moral
judgment which is not strictly utilitarian/consequentialist are
ill-advised. Thus, they reject Sunstein’s (2005) moral heuristics
approach, which regards departure from utilitarian rules as
biased; and they object to Greene’s dual processing theory, partly
on the grounds that Greene sees deontological judgment as
ethically inferior (Greene, 2008).
The stance of methodological atheism is very close to
the descriptivist position advocated by two of the authors
of the current manuscript (Elqayam and Evans, 2011; Evans
and Elqayam, 2011). Elqayam and Evans argued that any
normative evaluations are counterproductive in the psychological
study of reasoning and decision making. The business of
psychological science is to describe behavior rather than
evaluate or dictate it. Not only is there a lack of consensus
on normative standards in the psychology of reasoning and
decision making; any attempt to resolve this by drawing on
empirical evidence is in itself non-normative, drawing as it does
on an is-to-ought inference (see previous section, “How Do
Descriptions Become Norms?). It is easy to see how descriptivism
resonates with methodological atheism. The objections which
Elqayam and Evans raise are doubly true for the study of
moral judgment, where the lack of consensus is even more
pronounced. More generally, Holyoak and Powell object to
Greene’s dual process theory because it regards deontological
processes as type 1 processes. We certainly concur with
this: as commented in the “Introduction,” the evidence for
dual processing in moral judgment is equivocal. We remain
agnostic on whether people have a single unified system for
moral judgment as Holyoak and Powell suggest, or dual
systems.
However, there is also a clear point of disagreement between
our theory and the deontological coherence framework.
Within the latter, all elements in moral judgment interact;
importantly, Holyoak and Powell reject a possibility of
dissociation between these elements, proposing that ‘the
inputs to moral judgment processes are intertwined rather than
dissociated’ (p. 1193, italics ours). This is where we differ: we
contest the deontological coherence framework’s claim that such
factors are intertwined rather than dissociated. Such claim seems
to us premature. Instead, we suggest that a more productive
research question for the deontological coherence framework
would focus on the boundaries of this principle: when do
factors affecting moral judgment dissociate, and when do they
intertwine?
Our findings show that, while utilitarian judgments are
indeed affected by utilitarian, causal, and deontological factors,
this is not the case for deontological judgments, which are
much less sensitive to utilitarian and causal factors. Thus,
ratings of the morality of the utilitarian option were affected
by normative conflict (deontological), goal conflict (utilitarian),
and causal suppression (causal); while ratings of the morality
of the deontological option remained largely unaffected. While
the former is in accord with the deontological coherence
framework, the latter directly contradicts it. We do not claim
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that our findings are in any way exhaustive: it is entirely
conceivable that deontological moral judgment might be affected
by some of these factors in a different type of context, or
by different factors. We identify this as an essential question
for future research. An important caveat is that any such
mapping cannot draw on the typical trolley-type dilemmas,
since their forced-choice paradigm risks creating an artifact.
Any experimental design looking for dissociations should
examine utilitarian and deontological actions separately, as we
have.
Final Thoughts
The pattern we found suggests a family of informal inferences,
of which deontic introduction and utilitarian moral judgment
are members; but not deontological inference and deontological
moral judgment. What these types of inference have in common
is that they are norm-generating, consequential, and utilitarian:
they draw novel, tailor-made normative conclusions from
descriptive premises, based on evaluation of how good or
bad the consequences might be. Deontic introduction and
utilitarian moral judgment share these features. Deontological
inference and deontological moral judgment do not: they
reflect pre-existing norms instead. Hence, what affects deontic
introduction affects perception of utilitarian moral rightness,
selectively and exclusively. In contrast, no variables selectively
affected ratings deontological moral rightness. Admittedly,
the selective defeasibility pattern was not entirely pure. Still,
utilitarian moral judgment patterns are remarkably similar
to those of deontic introduction. We should also emphasize
that our position is strictly that of methodological atheism:
this is a psychological observation and not an ethical one.
In no way does it reflect on the moral worthiness of either
deontological or utilitarian judgment. (Indeed, to draw an
ethical conclusion here would be to commit an ‘is-ought’
fallacy.)
This family of norm-generating inferences we suggest
includes more than deontic introduction and utilitarian moral
judgment. There are other members, mostly other forms
of informal argumentation. Slippery slope arguments are a
good example (Corner et al., 2011): in this type of informal
argumentation, people draw negative normative conclusions
from negative descriptive premises, such as “legalization
of euthanasia will lead to an increase in the number of
instances of ‘medical murder”’, with the invited conclusion that
‘euthanasia should not be legalized.’ Similarly, persuasions and
dissuasions (Thompson et al., 2005) are informal arguments
expressed as conditional sentences with negative or positive
outcome, such as ‘If Britain leaves the European Union,
there will be a severe recession.’ This invites a matching
normative conclusion – in this case, it invites the listener
to infer that Britain should not leave the European Union.
Conceivably, deontic introduction is necessary to all these
inferences.
The novelty of our contribution is twofold. While utilitarian
moral judgment is by definition consequential and utilitarian,
little attention has been hitherto paid to its inferential and
norm-generating characteristics. Both aspects are worthy of
theoretical attention. That we can generate novel norms allows
us to create solutions to novel situations and direct future
action, a feature which takes on particular significance in the
context of novel moral dilemmas. The way that utilitarian
judgment allows us to create new normative rules adapted
to a changing world is by drawing deontic introduction
inference.
The second advantage of this novel conceptual framework
is that it integrates moral judgment research back into the
study of thinking and reasoning, with corresponding theoretical
and practical benefits to be reaped (Bonnefon, 2013). Recent
work in the field of moral judgment tends to prefer the term
‘moral judgment’ to ‘moral reasoning,’ perhaps because the latter
had become associated with the strongly Kantian approach
of Piaget (1997) and Kohlberg (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977).
This, however, does not and should not preclude discussion of
the inferential aspects of moral judgment. Such integration is
fully within the spirit of the new paradigm in psychology of
reasoning (Over, 2009; Oaksford and Chater, 2009; Elqayam and
Over, 2013). The new paradigm in psychology of reasoning is
a decision-theoretic, Bayesian approach to reasoning. It regards
reasoning as a branch of decision making, sensitive to the
same parameters. Reasoning, according to the new paradigm,
is based on degrees of belief rather than black-and-white,
binary truth values; it is defeasible; and it is sensitive to what
we desire and do not desire – utility, in other words. Our
family of norm-generating inferences is very much a new
paradigm family, containing as it does a host of informal
inferences, and regarding moral judgment as a type of informal
inference.
We also see benefit in designing new experimental paradigms
for moral judgment research that would liberate the field from its
dependence on forced-choice trolley problems. The controversy
around dual processing in moral judgment seems to have
reached a standstill; more sensitive measures could be useful for
advancing the debate.
Research in moral judgment has made progress in leaps
and bounds since the turn of the century. Yet much of it
remained curiously isolated from relevant work within the field
of reasoning, especially work on deontic reasoning. A closer
integration can only benefit both fields. In this paper we have
made a crucial step toward such integration.
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